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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Medvedev finally addresses Federal Assembly 
President Dmitri Medvedev finally delivered his first address to the Federal 
Assembly, after two postponements alternately explained as due to rapidly 
developing economic issues or his intention to wait for results from the American 
election. (1) 
 
Medvedev sounded some familiar themes during his speech, particularly 
regarding his intention to fight state corruption, but also set out specific political 
reforms, which will require changes to the Constitution.  
 
Medvedev's proposed political alterations would include changing both the 
registration procedure (specifically signature gathering) for parties, allowing 
parties that reach a five percent threshold to have one or two seats in the 
parliament, and, interestingly, providing for greater oversight of the executive, 
specifically the government, by the legislature through "a constitutional norm that 
will obligate the government of Russia to report to the State Duma annually on 
the results of its activity and on the issues directly set by the parliament." (2) 
 
 Of course, Medvedev's proposal to extend the presidential term to six years, and 
the terms of Duma representatives to five years, has garnered significant 
attention.  The extension of the constitutional limit on the president's term serves 
to confirm for many the concern that Putin merely stepped aside from the 
presidency in order not to contravene the constitution, but that he has every 
intention of reclaiming the position of president as soon as he is able.  
Medvedev's position on the matter may not even be relevant. Significantly, 
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Medvedev’s own current presidential term will not benefit from the proposed 
extension. 
 
Medvedev did sound several seemingly popular themes throughout his address, 
particularly when he spoke of Russia's values and democratic development.  
Even his calls to expand citizen rights, such as free speech, were tinged with his 
oratorical attack on corruption:  "freedom of speech should be ensured by 
technical innovations. Experience shows that trying to persuade officials to leave 
the media alone is practically useless. Instead of trying to persuade them, we 
should more actively expand the free space of the Internet and digital television." 
(3) 
 
As for the economic crisis, Medvedev returned to themes from his address to the 
World Policy Conference, making it clear that the Russian government now sees 
some value in laying responsibility for both economic instability and international 
political/military tensions at the feet of the US:  "Being closely linked to the 
markets of all developed countries while being the most powerful of them, the US 
economy dragged down the financial markets of the whole planet and this crisis 
also acquired a global nature. … The world cannot be ruled from one capital. 
Those who refuse to understand this will merely be creating new problems for 
themselves and others. The move by the majority of countries to a genuinely 
pragmatic multi-vector policy shows that the strengthening of international 
institutions is topical." (4) 
 
Russia's call for "multipolarity" in the international community has intensified in 
the wake of the August war in Georgia, but the louder keen thus far has had little 
effect.  Perhaps the expansion of the "polycentric" concept to the economic 
sphere will yield Russia the results it seeks. 
 
Could the economy rattle Putin's plans? 
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President Medvedev's criticism of the United States as responsible for the 
international financial crisis has another purpose for the Russian government – it 
shifts blame for economic difficulties from its traditional resting place on the head 
of the Prime Minister.  However, it is far from certain that as the extent of the 
economic difficulties Russia faces becomes clearer, Putin will be able to sidestep 
responsibility. 
 
Prime Minister Putin certainly has been front and center in addressing the 
financial woes of a tumbling market, financier bailouts, and bank closings.  Thus 
far, his role has been both to warn of the potential state response to "predatory" 
practices and to provide reassurance for favored oligarchs and banks. 
 
In the banking sector, Putin addressed the credit crunch and liquidity issues of 
regional banks by demanding that regional leaders crack down on possible 
takeovers of smaller banks by larger ones, which theoretically, might have 
represented a form of private bailout of local banks. (5)  Given the rapidity of 
developments in the crisis, however, Putin has had to acknowledge the dangers 
faced by the banking institutions by providing a federal bailout and putting federal 
deposit insurance in place.  Seeking, one assumes, to reassure citizens that their 
money is still safe in Russian banks, Putin announced that he would not withdraw 
his own funds from the bank:  "I had [sic] savings with Sberbank and VTB , I 
think, and they are all still there, and will remain there.  I see no need to do 
anything with these funds.  Our banking system is functioning and it's functioning 
smoothly." (6)  Whether or not Russia's citizens find Putin's commitment to leave 
at least some of his money in banks (specifically, banks, for which the Russian 
government has just put together a state-funded bailout) remains to be seen. 
 
One of the more difficult dimensions to the current international financial crisis is 
that the reverberations of any one government action, such as a bail out of one 
sector of the economy, resound across other sectors of the economy – a 
phenomenon that clearly is not restricted to individual national economies.  In this 
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liquidity crisis, it is clear that financial pressure "finds its own level," much like 
water.  Thus, as the Russian government attempts to bail out favored individuals 
in one sector (as, for example, the attempts to keep 25% of Oleg Deripaska's 
Norilsk Nickel out of foreign hands—See "Domestic Issues," below) leads both to 
increased pressure on Russian businessmen without Deripaska's pull, as well as 
pressure on other sectors of the Russian economy that did not benefit in the 
initial deal, and that now begin to appear weak, and suddenly require increased 
financial support from the government.  
 
A multidimensional crisis of this magnitude particularly tests the Russian 
government, because the Putin administration implemented a policy of increased 
government oversight and ownership of several key sectors and companies by 
packing corporate boards and leaderships with apparatchiki.  While the 
government's response to each company's economic demands can provide fairly 
reliable information about the relative status of various Kremlin clans, it also 
places inordinate pressure on the government's leadership as it attempts to keep 
ahead of the crisis.  In September, it was reported that Putin had ended the 
traditional weekly meetings of the government, and even curtailed the presidium 
meetings, in order to accommodate his travel schedule.  According to one 
analyst, "It seems simpler to Putin to resolve questions on an operational 
basis…."  (7) 
 
Given the dynamic nature of the crisis and the bottleneck created by centralized 
control of the response, it seems highly likely that Prime Minister Putin will be the 
focal point of attention, praise, and quite possibly recriminations, as the crisis 
spreads.  Deflection of responsibility onto the US for the initial stages of the crisis 
(which might have some utility in foreign policy) is not a reliable strategy as the 
domestic implications of the crisis unfold. 
 
Already, concerns about the government's handling of the mounting economic 
problems are appearing.  News accounts have appeared recently reviewing the 
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beneficiaries of government bailout largesse and some analysts suggest this 
would be a fortuitous moment for the government to rein in oligarch 
independence. (8) Perhaps most dangerously for Putin, the man associated with 
rescuing Russia from its devaluation crisis in 1998 has reemerged to warn of the 
perils of the current crisis.  
 
Former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov, who currently heads the Russian 
Chamber of Commerce, has "suggested" that the government act to reduce 
taxes on businesses concerned with "innovative activities" and took the 
opportunity to admonish and remind the government: "The problems of Russia's 
economic development cannot be taken separately from the effects of the world 
financial crisis on the country's socio-economic and political situation.  We will 
face serious trials in the future." (9) 
 
Of course, Putin has proven remarkably adept at evading responsibility for many 
of the bad decisions, adventurous choices, and avoidable catastrophes that have 
plagued Russia.  Even his apparent plan to circumvent the constitutional limits on 
his presidency by placing the Kremlin in the hands of a caretaker until he would 
be eligible to serve again appears to be on track.  Unless, that is, Russia's 
economic trauma leads to public discontent, and President Medvedev is 
persuaded to abandon his former mentor for a surer hand to steer the economic 
course. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Postponed Medvedev speech set for Nov. 5," 29 Oct 08, UPI via 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/10/29/Postponed_Medvedev_speech_set_f
or_Nov_5/UPI-84211225303807/  
(2) " Russian president Medvedev's first annual address to parliament," 5 Nov 08, 
Rossiya TV via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 2008-#202, 6 Nov 08. 
(3) Ibid.  
(4) Ibid.  
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(5) "Putin warns about bank takeovers," The Moscow Times, 26 Sep 08 via 
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1009/42/371236.htm. 
(6) "Russia's Putin says his own savings unaffected by crisis," 30 Oct 08, T15:37, 
Zvezda Television; OSC Translated Text via World News Connect (WNC). 
(7) "Putin said to no longer hold weekly government meetings, makes decisions 
himself," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 Sep 08; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union-
Political, 26 Sep 08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(8) See, for example, "Crisis offers the Russian authorities a unique opportunity 
to clean up oligarchs," Versiya, October 2008; Russian Oil and Gas Report via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Russian experts analyse company requests for state 
funding of foreign debt," Novaya gazeta, 30 Oct 08; BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union-Political via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) "Primakov calls for reducing the tax burden on innovation producers," ITAR-
TASS, 15 Oct 08, T13:16; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Russian bailout issues 
It can hardly be described as a silver lining on the cloud of Russia’s current 
financial meltdown, but it appears that Prime Minister Putin finally may have 
found a way to fulfill his 2000 presidential election promise to “destroy Russia’s 
oligarchs as a class.” (1) In the wake of last month’s announcement that the 
Russian government will lend $50 billion to companies that have seen massive 
losses in the past month, Russia's wealthiest men now are forced to choose 
between admitting defeat and accepting the Kremlin’s help. (2) 
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This is the opportunity that the government has been waiting for since it ceded 
control of many state-owned energy and production companies during the 
tremulous period of “loans for shares” privatization during the 1990s, when the 
oligarchs took major stakes in state-owned oil and metals companies as 
collateral for loans to the government.  In recent years, the oligarchs have taken 
to borrowing heavily from foreign banks, a practice that was considered to be a 
minimal risk in light of the robust economic growth of the period. Although 
investors long have lamented the lack of diversity in Russia’s economy, the 
commodities boom of the past decade has, up until now, provided enough 
revenue to sustain the country’s financial system. However, in the wake of the 
global financial crisis, the prices of Russia’s major commodities exports, including 
metals, energy, and food, have plummeted.  These three items constitute 
approximately 80 percent of Russia’s exports, a situation that was extremely 
beneficial when the prices were rising by more than 225 percent, on average, 
between 2000 and 2007.  Since June, however, these numbers have tumbled by 
more than 20 percent, prompting foreign investors to demand restitution on their 
loans. (3) 
 
Now that the oligarchs need help, the government has the chance to reverse the 
power balance of the past decade by reclaiming its lost assets, further 
consolidating its economic control.  Additionally, the economic lever now may 
give the Kremlin even greater control over those remaining business moguls 
who, up until now, had proven troublesome. 
 
Concern over the consequences of accepting loans from the government has not 
prevented some of Russia’s most influential individuals and companies from 
lining up for assistance.  This may have less to do with the Kremlin than the fact 
that the oligarchs “would rather start pumping oil with their own hands than lose 
their assets." (4) Oleg V. Deripaska, the wealthiest man in Russia thanks to his 
ownership of aluminum and mining company UC Rusal and the Norilsk Nickel 
company, was granted $4.5 billion last Wednesday, in order to keep 25 percent 
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of Norilsk out of the hands of his creditors. (5) Similarly, Mikhail Fridman 
announced last Friday that his Alfa Bank needed $400 million in emergency 
government loans to keep from defaulting on a $2 billion debt to a group of 
foreign creditors led by Deutsche Bank. If this happens, Alfa Bank would have to 
forfeit its significant (44 percent) share of VimpelCom, one of Russia’s leading 
telecommunications companies. Other firms that have put in bids for government 
aid include the property development firm PIK, state-owned Russian Railways, 
(6) Rosneft, and AFK Sistema. (7) 
 
Some argue that the Kremlin’s plan has no sinister secondary effect, but rather 
that it is part of a wider scope of operations designed to help the economy 
recover, including fortifying state banks, relaxing regulations governing borrowing 
money, or encouraging the Russian people to keep their faith in the ruble. (8) For 
its part, the government maintains that "the expansion of the government's 
presence in the economy is a forced measure that is of a temporary nature," in 
order to begin to regrow the economy as quickly as possible. (9) 
 
However, as of Wednesday, VEB had received requests for over $100 billion in 
loans.  This gap between requested and available funds is the source of the 
state’s sudden resurgence of power over private industry, a notable feat in an 
economy that already is controlled tightly by the government. (10) It remains to 
be seen how the power to decide which companies deserve to be saved and 
which do not affects the relationship between the Russian government and its 
independent corporate sector, especially as the state gains more and more 
control. 
 
To date, the Kremlin has demanded that any company seeking government 
assistance will have to offer as collateral a portion of ownership in their 
companies, the same amount that was promised to the foreign banks to secure 
the loans in the first place.  However, there is no telling what other conditions the 
government will place on its friendship. Possibilities include giving the state bank 
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veto power over companies’ financing decisions and the right to forbid borrowers 
from seeking other loans, (11) effectively giving the Kremlin control of privately-
owned corporations’ future financial development. 
 
In order to finance its massive bailout plan, the Kremlin has turned to its 
development bank, Vnesheconombank (VEB), chaired by Prime Minister Putin.  
VEB’s official mission is to use the country’s federal reserve, which at its peak 
($531 billion) was the third largest in the world, (12) to fund infrastructure projects 
(13).  However, in the past two months the government has begun to spend the 
reserve at an increasingly rapid pace, more than $30 billion in September and 
$15 billion during the second week of October alone.  Overall, more than $200 
billion has been pledged so far. (14) As of last week, the Central Bank reported 
that the foreign reserve currently stands at $484.7 billion, falling below $500 
billion for the first time in eight months. (15) 
 
In addition to the size of the bail out in total, the criteria by which individuals will 
receive Kremlin largesse is obscure, and therefore likewise controversial.  In 
early October, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs published a 
surprisingly direct letter calling for Putin to create transparent, public standards 
for financial aid distribution and warning about the dangers of favoritism. in light 
of the fact that if the spending continues, the reserve will last for less than two 
years. (16) Even the financial advisor who created the reserve strategy, Andrei 
Illarionov, has criticized his former employers for “frittering away the funds, 
directing them toward inefficient companies with political connections.” (17) 
 
Beyond these immediate concerns, two other facts must be considered.  The first 
is that foreign debt is approaching $450 billion. The $50 billion offered by the 
Russian government will do little more than pay off the most immediate debts 
that are due by the end of the year. (18) The second is that the same day that it 
announced Russia’s plan to finance the aid packages for the oligarchs, VEB 
cancelled many upcoming large-scale innovation and improvement projects, 
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including planned transportation infrastructure enhancement and the building of 
newer, safer airports. (19) By consistently choosing to focus on only one problem 
at a time, instead of the larger picture, the government has allowed for the 
possibility that even if it does manage to bail out its major corporations, there 
may be no end to the issues it will face in the future. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Torrey Clark and Henry Meyer, “Putin may use credit squeeze to ‘destroy’ 
Oligarchs,” Bloomberg.com, 17 Oct 08 via 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aR7ZSZbKh0so&refe
r=home. Last accessed 2 Nov 08.  
(2) Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Bailout could turn tables on Russia's oligarchs,” 
Associated Press, 31 Oct 08 via 
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j0suOQ1bwH0qjbURWfxOe1VKO4PQD945
NA380.  Last accessed 02 Nov 08. 
(3) Robert Skidelsky, “Crisis-hit Russia must scale down its ambition,” Financial 
Times, 30 Oct 08 via http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33955fac-a687-11dd-95be-
000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1. Last accessed 02 Nov 08.  
(4) Putin may use credit squeeze to ‘destroy’ Oligarchs, ibid.  
(5) Andrew E. Kramer, “A $50 Billion Bailout in Russia Favors the Rich and 
Connected,” New York Times, 31 Oct 08 via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/business/worldbusiness/31oligarch.html?sc=
1&sq=bailout%20in%20russia&st=cse. Last accessed 02 Nov 08.  
(6) Tony Halpin, “Russia bails out its debt-ridden billionaires,” The Times/Times 
Online, 31 Oct 08 via 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/russia/article5050879.ece. 
Last accessed 02 Nov 08.  
(7) Putin may use credit squeeze to ‘destroy’ Oligarchs, ibid.  
(8) Ibid.  
(9) Bailout could turn tables on Russia's oligarchs, ibid. 
(10) Russia bails out its debt-ridden billionaires, ibid.  
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(11) Putin may use credit squeeze to ‘destroy’ Oligarchs, ibid. 
(12) Phillip Pan, “Russian elite look to Kremlin for aid as wealth evaporates,” 
Washington Post, 17 Oct 08 via 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/16/AR200810160
4270.html?hpid=topnews. Last accessed 02 Nov 08.  
(13) Doug Saunders, “Russia’s financial crisis fortifies Kremlin’s hand,” 31 Oct 08 
via 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20081031.RUSSIA31/TPStor
y/TPInternational/Europe/.  Last accessed 02 Nov 08.  
(14) Russian elite look to Kremlin for aid as wealth evaporates, ibid.  
(15) Russia bails out its debt-ridden billionaires, ibid. 
(16) Russian elite look to Kremlin for aid as wealth evaporates, ibid. 
(17) Ibid. 
(18) Crisis-hit Russia must scale down its ambition, ibid. 
(19) Russia’s financial crisis fortifies Kremlin’s hand, ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Moskalenko not poisoned? 
On 12 October, Karina Moskalenko, a well-known anti-regime lawyer, contacted 
police in Strasbourg, France because she felt unwell.  When police searched her 
car, they discovered mercury. In an interview a few days after the incident, 
Moskalenko explained that the mercury did not constitute an assassination 
attempt, because the substance was so obvious, but rather a "demonstration," 
designed to warn her that she should curtail her legal activism. (1) Moskalenko's 
statements were echoed in a number of Western press outlets and received 
vocal support from Lev Ponomarev, leader of Russia's 'For Human Rights' 
movement, who told the Los Angeles Times that he had "no doubt" that the 
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incident constituted a "political crime," and that the Kremlin was "afraid" of the 
challenge represented by Moskalenko. (2) 
 
Developments of the last ten days indicate that Moskalenko may not have been 
the target of an assassination or warning attempt by the Russian secret services. 
On 23 October, a report in Le Figaro, one of France's leading newspapers, 
referred to a summation by the French police that the mercury in her car was the 
result of an "accidental" spill from a broken thermometer left in the car by its 
previous owner, an antiques dealer. (3) According to another report, a French 
police official stated that the mercury, which a laboratory has concluded is “no 
longer dangerous,” came from a “barometer that broke while being transported 
by the car’s previous owner.” (4) 
 
Moskalenko, according to Russia Today, has stated that she and her husband 
did not clean the car after purchasing it.  (5) 
 
Moskalenko obviously deserves to be commended for her work in defending 
opponents of the Russian regime. However, this incident raises questions. 
Obviously the treatment of dissenters by the Putin administration causes great 
concern, but Moskalenko seems to have jumped to conclusions before the full 
facts of the incident were known. If the French authorities are to be trusted (and 
at this stage there has been no challenge to their findings), Moskalenko may 
have changed her story, thus affecting her own reputation. Whether that is the 
case or not, there is something more serious at stake. As the 1999 apartment 
bombings, the Litvinenko and (probably) the Politkovskaya assassinations show, 
there is no shortage of accusations that can be leveled at the Russian secret 
services.  Prematurely making indictments diminishes the chances of making 
genuine claims stick, and may potentially delegitimize the cases of those 
individuals who have been targeted. 
 
FSB archives redux 
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In April 2007, then Director Nikolai Patrushev announced that the FSB had 
declassified some two million files in the preceding 15 years. Patrushev also 
claimed that the agency would release for publication some 300,000 files that 
would reveal the "real truth" about the great purges and famine. The 
announcement came with the caveat that files relating to operations and methods 
would remain classified. (6) It was clear at the time that the announcement was 
part of a broader attempt to prove the Secret Services’—and by extension the 
regime's—“humanity.” That effort apparently is continuing at present. 
 
On 23 October, during a press conference in Riga with his Latvian counterpart, 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that the FSB soon would be turning 
over to Latvian historians a selection of archival documents that, until now, had 
been sealed.  What files specifically are to be accessed is not clear, with Lavrov 
only stating what is obvious – namely that the documents concern cases in which 
the Latvian historians "evinced interest." (7) It is probably safe to assume that the 
files will concern the mass deportations and forced collectivization that occurred 
in the Baltic states between the Soviet reoccupation in 1944 and Stalin's death in 
1953, rather than anything politically relevant—such as information on Russian 
intelligence operations in the Baltics since 1991—to the present day. 
 
Patrushev role clearer? 
Within days of Dmitri Medvedev's accession to the Presidency in May of this 
year, a major personnel reshuffle was conducted in Russia's security apparatus.  
Nikolai Patrushev was transferred to head the Security Council, to be replaced at 
the FSB by Aleksandr Bortnikov. In light of Patrushev's connections to Vladimir 
Putin, it seemed likely that the move had two connected purposes: first, to ensure 
that Putin retained control of the Security bodies and secondly, to revitalize the 
Security Council and give it increased powers.  (8) 
 
In the last three weeks, Patrushev has been on two trips abroad that apparently 
hold great significance for Russia. In mid-October, as a significant portion of 
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Russia's navy was sailing towards Venezuela, Patrushev met in Caracas with 
senior Venezuelan officials, including Head of the General Staff Jesus Gregorio 
Gonzales, Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro, and Vice President Ramon 
Carrizales. (9) According to Gonzales, he and Patrushev had wide ranging and 
productive talks, but the main issue discussed was the development of military-
technical ties, particularly the updating of Venezuela's armored capabilities. 
Gonzales claimed that Venezuela wishes to purchase between 100 and 500 
tanks, as well as assorted helicopters, other aircraft and ships. (10) The armor 
being discussed is the T-90, an updated version of the T-72. (11) 
 
A week later, Patrushev visited India, where he met with his counterpart, M. K. 
Narayanan. Patrushev's discussions with Narayanan centered on Russia's 
Caucasus policies, counter-terrorism, and energy. (12) Patrushev claimed that 
the Indian government "fully" understood the problems faced by Russia in the 
Caucasus, supported Russia's policies, and stated that India would in future take 
an active observer role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia and 
India also will sign an intergovernmental declaration on Nuclear Power 
Cooperation when President Medvedev visits the latter country later this year. 
(13) 
 
Patrushev's travels, and the fact that he now apparently has a major role in 
negotiating arms sales, indicate that the hypotheses about the Security Council's 
renewed importance were correct.  Patrushev's role also indicates that the 
deduction made during the recent Georgian crisis—that Putin not Medvedev 
retains responsibility for national security matters—was accurate. 
 
Border Guards: South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
On 20 October, the FSB announced that its Border Guard Service was to be 
deployed on the Russian-Georgian border, i.e. in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
An agreement on the matter between Moscow, Tskhinvali, and Sokhumi is to be 
signed as soon as the Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
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Assistance with the two secessionist republics are ratified by the Duma. (14) 
Russia attempts to justify the deployment of the Border Guards in a number of 
ways. First, it claims that there is a need to "counteract threats of a terrorist or 
sabotage nature," supposedly emanating from Georgian soil. (15) Secondly, the 
Border Guards specifically are preventing heightened weapons smuggling (as a 
result of armaments abandoned by retreating Georgian forces), emanating from 
the two supposedly newly independent republics.  According to Valentin 
Letunovskiy, Chief of the regional Border Guards Directorate, there have been 
600 "border regime violations," since mid August, and the FSB has discovered a 
number of large weapons caches. (16) 
 
The allegation that Islamist terrorists are entering Russia via Georgia is not a 
new one – indeed, it has been used already as a post-facto justification for 
Russia's actions. But the new Russian argument about weapons smuggling is 
completely transparent. If arms were being smuggled from South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia into Russia, would it not make sense to deploy troops on these entities’ 
borders with Russia, rather than on the borders of Georgia proper and Russia? 
This supposition leads to the conclusion that the Border Guards’ deployment is 
little more than another attempt to create facts on the ground, in order to make 
the military objectives attained in August irreversible. Russia is seeking de facto, 
if not de jure, recognition of the new realities. 
 
Sources Notes:  
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 3 (23 Oct 08).  
(2) "Lawyer For Russian Dissidents May Have Been Poisoned," Los Angeles 
Times, 16 Oct 08 via www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-poison16-
2008oct16,0,5763910.story. 
(3) "Mercury Spill Called Accidental," Los Angeles Times, 24 Oct 08 via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(4) "French Police Doubt Rights Lawyer Was Poisoned," International Herald 
Tribune, 27 Oct 08 via www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/27/europe/28poison.php.  
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(5) "The Poisonous Commentariat," Russia Today, 23 Oct 08 via 
www.russiatoday.com/employee/27.  
(6) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 2 (26 April 07).  
(7) "FSB To Deliver Some Archival Materials To Latvia Historians," ITAR-TASS, 
23 Oct 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(8) "Politicians, Pundits Cited on Russian Security Council Reshuffle," 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, Moscow, in Russian, 27 May 08; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) "Russian National Security Council Secretary Holds Talks in Venezuela," 
ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 16 Oct 08; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) "Kommersant.com Headline: Venezuela Will Buy Russian Tanks-
Kommersant Moscow," Kommersant.com, 17 Oct 08; OSC Transcribed Text via 
World News Connection.  
(11) "Analysis: Venezuela Buys Russian Tanks," UPI, 15 Oct 08 via 
www.spacewar.com/reports/Analysis_Venezuela_buys_Russian_tanks_999.htm.  
(12) "Russian Security Chief Discusses Cooperation With Indian Counterpart," 
RIA-Novosti, 23 Oct 08; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(13) Ibid.  
(14) "Russian Border Service Reportedly To Guard Abkhazian, South Ossetian 
Borders Article by Vladimir Solovyev: 'Convoy to Follow Recognition. FSB To 
Appear on Borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,'" Kommersant, 21 Oct 08; 
OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(15) "Russia: Heightened Security Measures on Russian-Georgian Border (This 
Translation was Provided to OSC by another government agency),  Report by 
Aleksandr Khrolenko entitled: The Border Guard Service is at Heightened 
Status," Krasnaya zvezda, 20 Oct 08; OSC Translated Text via WNC.  
(16) "Russia: Black Market Weapons Trafficking On Rise After Georgian Conflict 
(This Translation Provided to OSC by another government agency). Article by 
Dmitri Steshin, Aleksandr Boyko, Shamil Dzhemakulov: Trophy Guns Stream 
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From Caucasus into Russia," Komsomolskaya pravda, 22 Oct 08; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military reform: Change we can believe in?   
The Russian military has continued its well-advertised exercises and battle drills 
over the last few months.  A large joint air defense drill was completed on 23 
October, when Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Tajik, and Uzbek 
militaries purportedly tested and exercised integrated air defense network 
operations. (1) The senior Russian Air Force officer, Colonel General Aleksandr 
Zelin noted, “All the tasks, including testing combat interoperability of CIS 
[Commonwealth of Independent States] air defense units, have been 
accomplished successfully.” (2)  (Ukraine is not a CIS member, but participates 
in some exercises.) Despite this effort and the much-touted naval task force 
exercise starting in the Caribbean Sea, there has been a series of Russian 
military staff activities with an eye towards large-scale reform.  These reforms are 
set to impact the organization, doctrine, manpower, and infrastructure of the 
Russian armed forces. 
 
With regards to the Russian army, there are plans for reducing the intermediate 
level of command as the current four-tiered status of military district-army-
division-regiment is scheduled to change to a three-tiered. Defense Minister 
Anatoli Serdyukov noted, “There will be no division-regiment level but brigades 
instead.” (3) Apparently, the Russian military assumes this reform will decrease 
military staff redundancy and increase command efficiency. This reorganization 
is scheduled for January 2009. (4)  In addition to the army’s efforts, the Russian 
Air Force also has announced the reorganization of its conduct of air defense 
operations.  The Russian Air Force now will have commands in the four zones of 
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the Far East, Siberia, South, and Northwest.  Colonel General Zelin noted, “The 
idea of the reform is to set up air bases to be built around air squadrons.  The 
intermediate link between air formations and squadrons—air divisions—will be 
excluded from the air force.” (5)  The air force clearly is following the Russian 
army model with an eye towards eliminating mid-tier leadership and staffs. 
 
Doctrinally, the Russian military is attempting to create mobile brigades for each 
of the military districts.  These brigades will be in a “permanent readiness status” 
and can operate independently or jointly with other smaller and leaner tactical 
formations. (6)  Supporting the new, lighter brigade structure, the Russian 
General Staff has been directed to reduce the logistical footprint.  The staff plans 
to cut army depots and military hardware by fifty percent. (7)  The amount of 
hardware not only is scheduled to be reduced, but it is hoped it can be upgraded, 
as well.  With regards to lessons learned during the August 2008 conflict in 
Georgia, Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, chief of the armed forces' Main 
Combat Training and Service Directorate commented, “We are also laying 
emphasis on the troops' provision with modern geographic positioning and 
communication devices, integrated with the tactical fire control system.” (8) 
 
These changes all are taking place in the midst of proposals for dramatic 
changes in Russian military manpower.  On 14 October, Defense Minister Anatoli 
Serdyukov announced plans for the military force structure to cut 150,000 officer 
positions by 2012.  This will enable the Russian military (currently with 32 percent 
officers) to trim down to “global standards” of 7 to 20 percent officer corps. (9)  
With the reduction of officers, the goal is to have a professional non-
commissioned officer (NCO) corps pick up much of the leadership void.  It is 
hoped that Russia’s warrant officers, whose numbers also are being reduced, will 
act as a bridge until the NCO corps is built within the next few years. (10)  These 
manpower reductions are affecting not just the army, but all services.  For 
example, the Russian Pacific Fleet is slated to lose approximately 4,500 officer 
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positions and these reductions are scheduled to take effect by the end of 2009. 
(11)  
 
Manpower not only is being reduced, but units from all services are being cut or 
disbanded.  For instance, an initial review of the force reduction includes cutting 
Ground Troops from 1,890 military units to 172 units; cutting the Air Force from 
340 to 180 units; the Navy from 240 to 123 units; the Strategic Missile troops 
from 12 to 8 units; and small reductions in the space and airborne forces. (12) 
 
While there are potential cost and tactical advantages to these reform measures, 
there is concern about these changes.  Military analysts opine that the timelines 
for implementing rapid change within the next few years are unrealistic, 
especially in regard to the requirement to upgrade technical systems, tactical 
intelligence, and command, control and communications. (13)  MP Vladimir 
Kashin of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) voiced dismay 
at these rapid changes and even has called for the Defense Minister’s 
resignation.  The proposed reforms, Kashin states are, “so alarming that we need 
an urgent intervention of the entire public in resolving the army's problem.” (14)  
 
Communist party deputies surmise that these changes are dangerous to 
Russia’s security and point out that, “it is planned to disband over 2,000 armed 
forces' units within three years. Not a single army of the world has had reforms at 
such a tempo.” (15)   
 
There are on-going debates that cover a wide range of complex issues regarding 
this planned reform of Russia’s military.  These include a thorough doctrinal and 
threat analysis of the roles and missions for the new brigades.  They also include 
equally important staffing efforts to determine the military force composition, 
required infrastructure, equipment research and development, and training 
needs.  In addition, emotional issues such as which organizations will be forced 
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to retire their regimental colors might even play a factor.  The reform clock is 
ticking.      
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
US sanctions prompt sound and fury 
Russian officials are reacting with voiced indignation at the United States’ 
imposition of sanctions on the state arms exporting entity, Rosoboronexport.  
Although the sanctions will have little material impact on the function of 
Rosoboronexport, the symbolic act is being interpreted in the context of chilling 
US-Russian relations and subjected to harsh criticism by Moscow’s foreign policy 
community.  It also may serve as a convenient justification for future Russian 
actions in opposition to Washington’s interests. 
 
On October 23, the US Department of State published an announcement of 
sanctions against Rosoboronexport, as well as a number of other “foreign 
persons,” pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
Nonproliferation Act. (1)  That act drastically curtails US government agencies’ 
abilities to deal with any organization providing a direct or “material contribution” 
to ballistic missile or WMD programs of the three listed countries. (2)  This is 
actually the second time that the arms exporting intermediary has been 
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sanctioned under the act; the last application expired in August after a stipulated 
two year period.  
 
Since cooperation between US government agencies and Russia’s state arms 
trader is insignificant, the material impact of the State Department’s sanctions is 
likely to be small.  Some have speculated that the act could damage Boeing’s 
relationship with Rosoboronexport subsidiary VSMPO-AVISMA in Verkhnaya 
Salda, a major supplier of titanium for the aerospace firm. (3)  However, the 
Boeing-VSMPO-AVISMA partnership antedates the original 2006 sanctions 
regime and similar concerns raised at that time proved to be unfounded. (4) The 
only arrangement of any consequence affected by the sanctions is the Defense 
Department’s acquisition of 22 Mi-17 transport helicopters for the Afghan military, 
and this deal received a waiver from the Secretary of State allowing it to proceed. 
(5) 
 
The State Department thus far has not specified exactly what Rosoboronexport 
did to warrant sanction this time. (6)  However, Rosoboronexport advanced its 
own theory in a statement, claiming “The reason for the decision […] is that the 
Russian Federation has supplied Iran with Tor-M1 SAM (surface-to-air-missile) 
systems and thereby has allegedly altered the balance of power in the region, 
among other things creating a threat to American armed forces.” (7)  The linkage 
of sanctions to Russia’s relationship to Iran was also made by the Russian 
Foreign Ministry.  Its statement on the matter explained, “As to Iran – it is 
precisely [military technical cooperation] with that country that the sharp edge of 
the new anti-Russian sanctions points to.” (8)  Sergei Kislyak, Russia’s 
ambassador in Washington, reportedly dismissed the sanctions as “politically 
motivated and unlawful.” (9)  In addition, Rosoboronexport officials, (10) as well 
as President Dimitri Medvedev, advanced the less plausible explanation that the 
action amounts to “unfair competition” on behalf of American arms exporters, 
with Medvedev oddly negating this argument in the same breath by admitting the 
decision “has practically no effect on us.” (11)  What appears most significant 
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about these condemnations is that they choose to interpret legally mandated 
actions directed at one Russian agency as a political maneuver directed against 
the state as a whole. 
 
Though Russian decision-makers have exploited the sanctions to score rhetorical 
points against Washington, some statements allude to the possibility of a more 
concrete response.  Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov assured reporters that “We 
will certainly take this into account in our practical affairs in relations with the 
United States, both in trade and economics and in other spheres.” (12)  The 
M.F.A. comment brings the issue back to Iran, claiming the decision is an 
“unfriendly act” and will have “an adverse impact” on the multilateral dialogue on 
the Iranian nuclear program.  It concludes, “It’s time for the United States to 
decide if it is ready to continue cooperation within the ‘Six’ [U.S., Russia, China, 
France, the UK and Germany] on the basis of agreed approaches.” (13) 
 
From these statements, it would seem that the decision likely will be exploited to 
provide an ex ante justification for further Russian interference with America’s 
anti-proliferation efforts against Iran.  Russia already opposes the latest US call 
for further sanctions on Iran, and the Rosoboronexport dispute will only harden 
its position. (14)  The sanctions also likely widen, if only slightly, the rift between 
Moscow and Washington that has been increasing for the last several years. 
 
Lavrov reaffirms Russia’s Indian ties 
On October 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was in New Delhi for 
talks with his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherkjee.  It was the third such 
exchange in 2008. (15)  The meeting was, at least in part, aimed at laying the 
groundwork for President Dimitri Medvedev’s visit to India in December.  The two 
also signed off on protocols for consultations between the foreign ministries of 
the two countries. (16)  At the press conference following his meeting, Lavrov 
was effusive in his characterization of Russo-Indian relations:  
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Russia and India are strategic partners that have been developing their relations 
in all areas without exception – trade, economy, high technologies, science, 
education, culture, foreign policy. I absolutely agreed with Pranab Mukherjee that 
our many-sided strategic partnership, apart from its substantial importance for 
both countries, is one of the major factors for stability in the world as a whole. 
(17) His words echoed those of Mukherjee and reaffirmed the friendly nature of 
ties between Moscow and New Delhi. 
 
Lavrov also called for a more prominent Indian role in global affairs.  He voiced 
his support for India “to become more actively involved in […] various 
international structures, like the G8 for example.”  The foreign minister then 
stated that India was a “strong candidate” for a permanent UN Security Council 
seat. (18) 
 
Lavrov and Mukherjee also gave indications that further progress had been made 
on bilateral civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries.  Although details 
were not revealed, this may refer to the proposed addition of four nuclear 
reactors to Kudankulam in India’s Tamil Nadu province. (19)  This proposal, 
advanced as early as 2005, previously had run aground on concerns over the 
lack of a mandate from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to India’s absence from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). (20)  
 
However, since the two organs approved an end to restrictions on India at the 
behest of the United States, a new window of opportunity appears to have 
opened for Russia.  When asked about these prospects, Lavrov responded, 
“Cooperation in this field [nuclear cooperation] will be developing on the widest 
scale.” (21)  In fact, a preliminary agreement on civil nuclear cooperation already 
has been reached and Medvedev is expected to sign it when he arrives next 
month. (22) 
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The outcome of this exchange, especially the movement on nuclear cooperation, 
is indicative of the importance Moscow attaches to its relations with India.  It can 
no longer take these ties for granted, as it could when India tilted toward the 
Soviet Union during the decades following independence.  Russia is facing new 
competition in its traditional, lucrative role as India’s ally and arms supplier.  It 
must therefore be vigilant to prevent India from becoming too closely aligned with 
the United States.  New Delhi, on the other hand, while certainly wishing to 
expand its connections with Washington, does not wish to fall into the orbit of any 
single great power, and thus will continue its multi-vector foreign policy. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Cassandra of Vilnius 
Lithuania was the first republic to declare independence from the USSR in 1990. 
In the years since, the Baltic state has remained the last EU member willing to 
trust Moscow. When Russian tanks rolled into Georgia last August, Lithuania was 
among the most vociferous critics of Moscow’s aggression against a smaller 
neighbor. Now, as the EU sets the stage to resume talks with Russia on the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Lithuania's President Valdas Adamkus 
is heaping scorn upon his colleagues’ conciliatory attitude. “This is a humiliation 
for the entire European Union,” he said in reference to Moscow’s failure to 
respect the terms of an EU-brokered ceasefire. (1) 
 
In Paris, EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana brushed aside anti-Moscow 
concerns with the observation that “indignation is not a policy,” (2) but in Vilnius, 
campaign promises to address Russian hostility helped Homeland Union, a 
conservative party critical of Moscow, secure a majority of parliamentary seats in 
elections held late in October. (3) Andrius Kubilius, the Homeland Union leader 
who is likely to become the next president of Lithuania, says that, in spite of 
inflated rhetoric, Lithuania’s leaders have been passive in dealing with Russia. 
He is urging the new coalition government to adopt a foreign policy line 
encapsulated by the statement “Russia is a threat.” “We think it is necessary to 
strive to call Russia what it really is at the European level. Russia needs to be 
called by its real name,” he told reporters. (4) 
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Cassandras in Vilnius, Lithuanian leaders are not safer than their European 
partners, for all their foresight. In the same election that brought the anti-Kremlin 
Homeland Union party to power, a referendum failed to extend operation of the 
Ignalina nuclear power plant that generated 70 percent of the nation’s electricity, 
leaving the country without a significant domestic source of power for perhaps a 
decade. (5) 
 
In 2004, Ignalina, a Soviet-era nuclear power plant, was slated for decommission 
as part of a package of measures designed to bring Lithuania into conformity with 
western safety standards, when Lithuania joined the EU. (6) The first shut-down 
phase took place in 2004 and the second, final phase is set for the end of 2009. 
At the start of negotiations toward decommission, Lithuanian officials looked 
forward to replacing the decrepit facility with a new nuclear power plant that 
would be built in cooperation with Latvia and Estonia. In 2007, Poland signed on 
as a partner in the project. In June, a newly formed national energy company, 
LEO LT, announced a target date for completion between 2015 and 2018. (7) 
 
In the meantime, Lithuania will have to look to neighboring countries to meet its 
energy needs. On a visit to Washington in September, President Adamkus 
discussed Lithuania’s quest for energy independence with President Bush, who 
promised that the United States would “try to help you as best as we can.” (8)  
Officials in Vilnius have been seeking partners among fellow EU members, but 
with little reported success. Most Western European nations prefer bilateral 
contracts with Russia’s state-controlled energy giant Gazprom, to cooperation 
with other EU members on a multi-national level. Lithuanian leaders are reluctant 
to deepen the nation’s dependence upon Russia as its primary supplier of 
energy. Already, the country relies upon Gazprom for its total volumes of natural 
gas, and analysts expect Lithuanian consumption to rise substantially as gas-
powered plants are brought online to replace Ignalina. (9) There is concern 
among policy makers that Russia will take advantage of the fact that Lithuania 
depends on Russia’s natural gas to press for political concessions, or to deliver a 
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punitive blow to Lithuania’s national economy, as it did in August 2006 when the 
Russian pipeline monopoly Transneft cut oil supplies to the country’s only 
refinery. 
 
If Lithuania is serious about securing its energy independence, it is well advised 
to begin building its new nuclear power plant posthaste. On October 28, Russia’s 
nuclear energy state corporation Rosatom unveiled plans to construct a massive 
nuclear power station in Kaliningrad Oblast, on the Baltic Sea, Lithuania’s 
western neighbor. The plant’s first unit is slated to come online in 2015. (10) 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Aliyev and Sarkisian sign “joint declaration” 
At a meeting hosted by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, Armenian President 
Serzh Sarkisian and Azeri President Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration to 
“continue work, including through further contacts at the highest level, on 
reaching a political settlement to the [Nagorno Karabakh] conflict” and have 
directed their foreign ministers to work on the negotiation process with the OSCE 
Minsk Group co-chairs, representatives of Russia, the United States, and France. 
(1) Clearly, the document lacks new substance—agreeing to continue talks, while 
a necessary step, is hardly a substantive breakthrough. 
 
In fact, the Azeri and Armenian foreign ministers have met several times in the 
last two months. What is significant, however, is Russia’s role as facilitator for the 
agreement and the reference to the Minsk Group as the format for talks. Recent 
meetings between the foreign ministers on the sidelines of the United Nations 
General Assembly took place within the format of the Minsk Group, but also later 
included a tri-lateral meeting with the Turkish foreign minister. Since the meeting 
of Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian in 
September, Turkey has taken steps to play a larger role in the Nagorno 
Karabakh talks. The meeting in Moscow seems designed to undercut Ankara’s 
attempt to exert influence in the region. 
 
South Ossetia: Post-conflict situation 
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Russia has moved swiftly to consolidate its position within the rebel Georgian 
republic of South Ossetia. On 22 October, South Ossetian de facto president 
Eduard Kokoity nominated his candidate to replace former Prime Minister Yuri 
Morozov, who was relieved of his post on 18 August in the wake of the Russian 
invasion. Kokoity’s choice is Aslanbek Bulatsev, who, until confirmed by the 
South Ossetian parliament, had held the position of chief of the North Ossetian 
branch of the Russian Federal Tax Service. There is nothing subtle about the 
overt mingling of North and South Ossetian personnel or its indication of the 
consolidation of Russian influence in the separatist republic. Adding insult to 
injury, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is sponsoring (from the Moscow city budget) 
the construction of a new settlement (“Moscow district”) in Tskhinvali, built on the 
site of a neighborhood occupied by ethnic Georgians before the August war. (2) 
 
Even more overt is the announcement that the FSB will be stationing troops at 
the South Ossetian and Abkhaz borders that the separatist regions share with 
the rest of Georgia. (3) These troops are in addition to those already proposed by 
Defense Minister Anatoli Serdyukov in early September. 
 
New Georgian Prime Minister 
Lado Gurgenidze has been replaced as Georgian Prime Minister by former 
ambassador to Turkey, Grigol Mgaloblishvili. Gurgenidze will now head a newly 
established financial and investment commission under the president. 
Mgaloblishvili was educated in Tbilisi, Istanbul, and Oxford and has never held a 
political position. His previous experience has all been with the Foreign Service 
Ministry. He has announced as his goal “Georgia without poverty,” a reference to 
Saakashvili’s campaign slogan, but has stated that dealing with the aftermath of 
the Russian invasion and the global financial crisis will take immediate priority. 
(4)  
 
Mgaloblishvili’s newly confirmed cabinet brought few surprises – he brought in 
new ministers of Justice, Culture, Refugees, and Environment, but retained the 
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controversial Interior Minister Vano Mirabishvili as well the Minister of Defense 
and others. One of his first actions as Prime Minister was to request permission 
to revise the 2009 draft budget in keeping with “the government’s goals.” (5) 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Guaranteed employment the cure for Kazakhstan’s financial ills?  
Although all of the Central Asian countries likely will suffer due to the global 
financial crisis, Kazakhstan seems to be the only one among them whose 
banking sector is suffering any ill effects.  The other four Central Asian states 
may lose significant chunks of promised foreign investment, which could be 
devastating, particularly for the two weakest, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but their 
banking industries probably will be spared any direct blows.  Kazakhstan’s 
banks, on the other hand, are feeling the consequences of the credit crunch, 
causing sufficient concern in government circles to warrant a US$5 billion bailout, 
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as well as other measures designed to increase liquidity at the central bank and 
help mitigate the effects of bad loans. (1) 
 
Credit began tightening in Kazakh markets roughly one year ago, in response to 
the US mortgage crisis.  In order to fund construction projects at home, in 
response to a high demand for housing in the country’s larger cities, Kazakh 
banks borrowed money internationally.  The credit crisis followed much the same 
path as in the US – Kazakh banks lowered their interest rates and gave loans to 
borrowers whose credit was questionable as the pressure from construction firms 
and investors eager to capitalize on a high demand for new housing in urban 
areas increased.  When the international credit market began to collapse, 
Kazakh banks raised their interest rates, as well as the criteria required for the 
issuance of additional loans, bankrupting some construction companies.  These 
companies then in turn defaulted on their contracts with investors, leaving many 
people both without new homes and the funds that they had invested in their 
construction.  Even housing projects financed by the government have been 
affected and now stand unfinished and abandoned to the elements. (2) 
 
Industries that supplied the construction boom naturally also have been affected 
– the mining and metal industries have cut back production, due to both a drop-
off in local and global demand for metals such as steel and copper.  CEO of the 
Kazakhmys corporation, Eduard Ogai, announced that his company had 
suspended production at three mines and predicted an uncertain future for the 
industry as a whole: “the situation on the global metal markets is unstable, only 
those who have low production costs will survive.” (3)  Minister of Industry and 
Trade Vladimir Shkolnik gave a more comprehensive overview of the problems 
facing the metals and mining industry: “…sales have declined at all companies 
operating in the sector. By the end of the year, according to ministry's estimates, 
there is a high risk of a decline in overall industrial performance including a 
possible drop in production at all ENRC [Eurasian National Resource 
Corporation] units.” (4)  Since ENRC is one of Kazakhstan’s largest companies, 
 34 
accounting for approximately 4% of the country’s GDP, with the Kazakh 
government and Kazakhmys holding 24.8% and 18.8% stakes in it, respectively, 
any significant downturn in its production could help trigger an even more severe 
contraction in the national economy. (5) 
 
Also according to Minister Shkolnik, Arcelor Mittal, a major player in both 
Kazakhstan’s steel and coal sectors, has decreased steel production by 60% (6) 
and laid off all of the workers at its Temirtau plant (Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
referred to the lay-offs as a “mandatory vacation,” when meeting with Arcelor 
Mittal president Lakshmi Mittal early in October). (7)  The company’s steel 
production facilities alone employ 50,000 people. (8)  Given the gravity of the 
situation in the metal industry, Shkolnik recommended a series of measures the 
government should take to shore up this sector of its economy, to ward off further 
employment lay-offs.  His recommendations included the offer of state financial 
assistance via the SamrukKazyna National Welfare Fund (a state fund recently 
created to provide new loans to companies affected by the global financial crisis), 
lifting export duties on aluminum (based on the fact that world market prices for 
aluminum currently do not cover the production cost), and immediately 
reimbursing all VAT owed by the government. (9)  One of the main targets of 
these financial bailout measures not only seems to be maintaining national 
employment levels, but also guaranteeing that individual companies’ workforces 
remain employed in one way or another, period. 
 
To that end, Kazakhstan’s Industry of Ministry and Trade and the country’s three 
largest mining companies (Sokolov-Sarbai Mining Production Association, 
Arcelor Mittal, and Kazakhmys) signed a five-party memorandum with regional 
authorities, labor unions and SamrukKazyna National Welfare Fund on October 
28 in which the companies pledged not to implement any more layoffs or 
employment reductions, as well as to carry forward their investment projects. (10)  
Given the current uncertainties in the global economy, which have brought some 
of the wealthiest and most respected western firms to their knees, it may not be 
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so surprising that the Kazakh government has reverted to the use of the Soviet-
era concept of guaranteed employment, in an effort to stave off the twin specters 
of large-scale unemployment and social unrest.  And perhaps the scope of the 
bailout being offered to the three companies involved is such that their respective 
CEO’s consider their continued solvency to be foolproof – undoubtedly, time will 
soon tell. 
 
However, should the global financial crisis continue beyond the next year, 
causing world markets to contract even further, the Kazakh government may 
need to revisit its bailout plan.  Over the past nine months, the banking industry’s 
net profit was down 62%, 52.7% of loans made by the banking sector were 
deemed “questionable,” 3.3% were designated “unreliable,” with total liabilities to 
non-residents accounting for 44.7% of the banks’ total financial obligations. (11)  
If a significant proportion of these “non-residents” default on their loans, the effect 
on the Kazakh government’s ability to keep credit flowing and, thus, keep both 
large and medium-sized businesses afloat, could be severely challenged.  The 
country currently is in a situation where revenues are dropping, while the 
government must pump billions of dollars from its reserves into banks and 
industries, in order to keep them from collapsing, while the fallout from the 
worldwide financial crisis has just begun to make its effects felt.  Guaranteed 
employment for certain sections of the industrial workforce, even if it can be 
maintained, will not protect the average Kazakh citizen from a steadily rising cost 
of living or from the loss of their mortgage investments, for which neither the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade nor the SamrukKazyna Fund seem to have an 
answer. 
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BELARUS 
Lukashenko’s latest balancing act  
During the last week of October, Belarus began negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund for a $2 billion emergency loan program.  The 
request for assistance came as the country’s largest export customers in the 
Baltic States, Poland, and the Commonwealth of Independent States have 
curtailed purchasing dramatically. 
 
Given the Belarusian economy’s lack of integration into the global financial 
system, and the continuing control of all media sources by the government, it is 
unclear exactly how deeply the country is being affected by the worldwide 
economic slowdown.  As of 2005, the private sector contributed only one-fifth of 
GDP, while at the same time, over half of the country’s exports were controlled 
by just 20 huge, state-owned companies.  (1) 
 
Although the government has provided no figures, its largest exporters—for 
example, the BelAz trucking company, the Belarusian Metallurgy Plant and the 
Belaruskalii fertilizer plant—are facing serious financial hurdles as prices for 
metals have plummeted and orders for transport vehicles have all but dried up.  
Moreover, since the banking sector is forced by state order to prop up the 
majority of the country’s unprofitable public enterprises, there is little doubt that 
Belarus must be facing a major credit crunch.    
 
Bloomberg reported one week ago that the country already had expended over 
10 percent of its financial reserves and continued to spend vigorously to prop up 
the currency and banking sector. (2)  At the same time, the country announced 
that, for the first time, it would allow 50 percent foreign ownership of banks, 
should investors be located.  
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Even if the impact of the global crisis were minimal, however, the economy is far 
from sound, thanks to years of mismanagement.  This means that even small 
shocks could be disastrous. 
 
President Aleksandr Lukashenko must believe that the crisis is severe and must 
see no other alternative, since his government’s past relations with the IMF have 
not been smooth. In 1996, an IMF loan program was discontinued when 
Lukashenko stopped all privatization.  In 1999, even as the economy was 
freefalling after Russia’s “Black Monday,” the Belarusian president refused to 
request IMF support.  He accused the Fund of a desire to steal his country’s 
natural resources in return for funding.  Only later, in the face of severe food 
shortages, did he request and receive $100 million.      
 
In recent years, however, Lukashenko has chosen to depend on the kindness of 
Russia, which has supported his country with billions in energy subsidies and 
cash loans every year.  
 
In 2006, the Bratislava-based Pontis Foundation completed an examination of 
Belarus' energy market in relation to its economy, and found that Belarusian 
authorities and government-owned businesses make considerable profits by 
importing Russian oil into Belarus at bargain prices and then exporting it to the 
EU at market—or just below market—prices.  These contracts with the EU are 
reportedly worth up to 3.3 billion euros each year and have allowed Lukashenko 
to maintain his country at a minimum subsistence level. (3) 
 
In 2006, the former head of Belarus’ National Bank also studied the gas and oil 
trade between Belarus and Russia and concluded that the discounted prices paid 
by Minsk to Russia saved the country $4 billion per year.    (4) 
 
Therefore, thanks to its contracts with Russia, Belarus receives up to $10 billion 
per year through payments or subsidies.  This total is equal to one-third of the 
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country’s GDP. Just one week ago, Moscow stepped up again, promising 
Belarus a $2 billion loan.  The money will be applied to Belarus’ debt for gas and 
oil from Russia.  Despite historically close relations, however, Moscow did not 
offer any further help.  
 
Russia’s decision not to subsidize Belarus fully during this current crisis signals 
growing tensions between the two countries.  In particular, Russia recently has 
shown irritation over Lukashenko’s refusal to recognize the independence of 
Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia separatist regions.  Despite promising 
more than once to do so, no recognition has come.   In fact, it seems unlikely that 
it will come any time soon.  
 
On 8 September, after earlier promising to issue a statement himself, 
Lukashenko instead passed the question on to members of parliament.  “They 
will address the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” he said.  “We cannot 
keep silent.”  He added, however, that the issue “is not only an issue of what 
Russia wants or doesn’t want,” before suggesting that he had “warm relations” 
with Abkhazia’s leadership.  (5)    
 
On 27 October, Belarus’ head of the lower house of parliament Uladzimir 
Andreychanka—an ally of the president—suggested that parliament would 
consider the issue only if a motion is brought on the issue.  “But no such motion 
has been brought,” he said.  (6)  Further, he could not say who might introduce 
such a measure.   This is despite direct requests to Lukashenko from the 
leadership of both separatist republics to follow Russia’s lead and recognize the 
independence of their regions.   
 
Lukashenko acknowledged the receipt of such requests in a terse statement 
placed on his official website on 25 September.   The statement left more 
questions than answers.  In its entirety, it read, “President of Abkhazia Sergei 
Bagapsh and President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoita have addressed letters 
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to President of Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko with a request to recognize the 
independence of these republics. Response letters stating the position of the 
Belarusian side on this issue have been sent to the heads of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.”   The statement notably ends before detailing the stated “position of the 
Belarusian side.” (7) 
 
Belarus’ reluctance to support Russia’s Georgia policy fully came almost directly 
following suggestions from the EU that it would consider lifting the most severe 
sanctions facing the country.  In particular, in August, the EU began quietly 
suggesting that, if certain conditions were met, it would lift the travel bans 
affecting up to 40 Belarusian politicians.  The majority of these bans were put into 
effect in 2006, following Lukashenko’s reelection in a poll found to be fraudulent 
by all major electoral monitoring organizations.  However, the country has been 
under some type of international sanction since 2000.  
 
Therefore, Lukashenko has existed for almost a decade as a virtual pariah to all 
but Russia, a few former Soviet allies, and the world’s best rogue states.  With 
each passing year, he and his country have become even more isolated and 
dependent on Russia’s financial and political support.  That support, however, 
has become increasingly grudging.  Even the once heralded Russia-Belarus 
Union State has passed into the realm of virtuality, with agreements and edicts, 
but no real structure or power – except for an appointed, toothless Parliamentary 
Assembly.  
 
No one can ever know the mind of Lukashenko, but he reacted hesitantly 
following Russia’s invasion of Georgia, remaining silent for several days.  Even 
later, Belarus failed to condemn Georgian actions fully.  The statements of 
support expected by Russia for its actions never materialized.  
 
On Lukashenko’s official website during the period of open Russian-Georgian 
hostilities, the President congratulated Olympians, wished ‘happy birthday’ to 
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other state leaders and expressed his solidarity with China, among other things.  
He made no mention of the war.  
 
Finally, on 28 August, Lukashenko responded to Russian media questions about 
Belarus’ position in a letter to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.  He 
suggested that he supported the right of self-determination for the residents of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia “in accordance with fundamental international 
documents,” and assured Medvedev that Belarus remained “a reliable and 
consistent ally of Russia.”  (6)  It was far less than Russia had desired.  
 
The Russo-Georgian war also occurred directly before Belarus’ 2008 
parliamentary elections.  Every election held by Lukashenko since 1994 has 
failed to meet international norms for a free and fair election.  In early and mid-
2008, it seemed Lukashenko would conduct this one using the same methods of 
the past – jailing opposition members and campaigners and refusing to allow 
opposition candidates on the ballot.  
 
But suddenly in August, Lukashenko released all internationally-recognized 
political prisoners and announced that opposition members would be allowed on 
the parliamentary ballot.  Seventy opposition representatives contested the poll 
for 110 seats.   The suggestion that Russia was prepared to incorporate small 
countries (or sections of them) by force apparently had an effect. 
 
Although opposition members were allowed to run, they were not allowed to 
campaign, and none of the opposition candidates won a seat.  Parliament will 
continue to be filled with presidential loyalists, suggesting that Lukashenko’s 
actions were little more than window dressing.  Still, the EU used the very slight 
thaw in Lukashenko’s policies to justify lifting most of the sanctions against 
Belarus.  
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In reality, Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg admitted that the move 
was designed to take advantage of the seemingly tense relations between 
Russia and Belarus, and suggested that the EU realized that the only effect of its 
limited sanctions had been to push Belarus closer to Russia.  “Frankly speaking,” 
he said, “by strengthening Belarusian links to Russia no further progress in 
democracy will occur.”  (7) 
 
EU leaders also privately suggested that they hoped the move would blunt 
Russian efforts to station a missile defense base on the Belarusian-Polish 
border.  (8) 
 
Now, Belarus is reaching out to an agency once ridiculed and attacked.   The 
biggest question created by such a move is whether such overtures are sincere 
or simply designed to force Russia to provide more assistance.  In the past, 
whenever Lukashenko has moved toward the West, the latter has proven true. 
 
UKRAINE 
Will political instability undermine IMF support?  
On 5 November, the International Monetary Fund officially approved a 16.4 billion 
dollar credit line to Ukraine.  The money is intended to be used by government 
officials to ease the liquidity crisis in the country’s banks, increase consumer 
confidence and help support the country’s faltering metallurgic industry, which 
has already seen tens of thousands of lay-offs.   (11) 
 
By accepting the loan, the country commits itself to conducting banking sector 
and currency reform, as well as a stringent economic policy low on social 
spending.   Should it not follow through on its promises, Ukraine risks the loss of 
one or more tranches of the loan.  Given the current atmosphere in Ukraine, the 
likelihood of losing the tranches far outweighs the country’s ability to implement 
financial sector reform.   
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The problem, as it has been for three years, is an ongoing battle between 
President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.   The 
President dissolved parliament on 8 October and set new elections for December 
in what was viewed by most as an attempt to remove Tymoshenko from her post.  
The Prime Minister, understanding that she may lose her position following 
December’s elections, fought back by blocking all funding mechanisms for the 
election.  She was assisted in her battle against the election by the global 
financial crisis, which soon forced Yushchenko to reinstate parliament for votes 
on the financial “anti-crisis” stabilization package supported by the IMF.  
 
Following the successful vote on the package, Yushchenko surprisingly 
attempted to force through legislation funding the election.  The president, it 
seems, was unconcerned about the effect of months of election campaigning 
followed by months of negotiating for a parliamentary majority in the midst of the 
worst global economic crisis in decades.  
 
The majority of his supposed allies did not agree with his view; the election 
funding measure failed by four votes.   In the end, faced with a burgeoning 
economic crisis, the parliamentary bloc of former Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn and 
over 40 members of Yushchenko’s bloc joined Tymoshenko’s allies in voting 
against the measure.   Yushchenko is now forced either to ignore or annul his 
decrees dissolving parliament and setting a new election.  It is a major political 
defeat for the president, and a clear victory for Tymoshenko.  
 
However, the president has not dropped his call for an election.  Speaking in 
Western Ukraine, the president stated that elections were the only way out of the 
political crisis.  He suggested that Tymoshenko had destroyed her relations with 
his allies, and members of his bloc had no wish to return to a coalition with her 
bloc.  “I am sure,” he said, if the Prime Minister had acted honestly towards the 
coalition, hadn’t negotiated behind-the-scenes, hadn’t held consultations how to 
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turn the course of Ukraine to another direction, this coalition would have worked 
for a long time.”  
 
Almost immediately, six out of the nine parties in Yushchenko’s bloc refuted the 
president’s statements, firmly expressing their opposition to an election and their 
wish to reformat the coalition that ended when Yushchenko removed his bloc 
from it.  “We yet again responsibly declare that the coalition of democratic forces 
in parliament should and must be renewed in a matter of hours. For this only one 
thing is required - the wish and political will of the president,” they wrote in a 
statement.  (12) 
 
In fact, IMF officials privately worry that the disagreements within Ukraine’s 
political forces—and in particular between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko—will 
undermine the changes necessary to restore Ukraine’s economy.  What 
politician, after all, would freeze pensions or wages in the midst of an election?  
How can investor confidence be restored while the work of the government is 
continually undermined by threats of parliament’s dissolution?  
 
Tymoshenko seems to realize this and reached out to Yushchenko during a 
television debate one week ago.  “Let’s for once not get into these political 
dogfights and come together as a national team with a united program,” she said. 
“Be a team in the face of this big global challenge.” (13)   Yushchenko balked.  
Instead, he accused the government of gathering debt “like fleas on a dog.” (14)  
(some Ukrainian media have translated Yushchenko’s remarks as “like a bitch 
gathers fleas.”) 
 
Moreover, looking toward Tymoshenko, Yushchenko rejected claims that the 
global crisis was affecting the country.  “The world crisis?  Lies! The crisis is 
sitting right here,” he said. (15) 
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Seeing this, it is no wonder that the IMF chose to disburse its aid in at least three 
tranches over two years.  
 
 Source Notes: 
(1) “Belarus Economy Greased by Oil,” The Moscow Times, 16 Mar 06 via Lexis-
Nexis and “Lukashenko’s heavy hand no obstacle to growth,” Euromoney, Oct 
2004 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) “Belarus Asks IMF for Credit Line as Economy Falters (Update3),” 
Bloomberg, 23 Oct 08, via www.bloomberg.com.   
(3) The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 7, 20 Jul 06 via www.bu.edu/iscip 
(4) “Lukashenko’s heavy hand no obstacle to growth,” Euromoney, Oct 2004 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “Lukashenko: In the near future Belarus will recognize Abkhazia's and South 
Ossetia's independence,” The Caucasian Knot, 8 Sept 08 via 
http://eng.kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/engnews/id/1228677.html   
(6) “New Belarus speaker noncommittal on recognition of Georgian rebel 
regions,” Belapan News Agency, 27 Oct 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “Presidents of Abkhasia and South Ossetia Address Letters to President 
Alexander Lukashenko with Request to Recognise their Independence,” Official 
Website of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko, 25 Sept 08 via 
http://president.gov.by/en/press62635.html. 
(8)  “President Aleksander Lukashenko Sends Message to Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev,” Official Website of Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko, 
28 Aug 08 via http://www.president.gov.by/en/press61242.html. 
(9) Prague Daily Monitor, 13 Oct 08 via www.praguemonitor.com  
(10) “EU suspends travel ban on Belarus leader,” Financial Times, 14 Oct 08 via 
www.ft.com. 
(11) “IMF approves 16.4 bln dollar aid for Ukraine,” Reuters, 5 Nov 08 via Yahoo 
News. 
(12) Forpost, 4 Nov 08 via www.lviv.ua. 
(13) New York Times, 4 Nov 08 via Yahoo News. 
 46 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) Ibid. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2008 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1504.html. 
